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Reviewed By Deborah Zalesne and John Guyette
Why is marriage thriving for high-income, well-educated elites, and dying
for low-income, less-educated couples? “[I]t’s the economy, stupid,” argue
authors June Carbone and Naomi Cahn in their thoroughly investigated new
book Marriage Markets: How Inequality is Remaking the American Family (5). Marriage,
the authors posit, is a deal similar to other bargains, driven by market forces.
For some, marriage is a more realistic “deal” to make, and comes with greater
chances for a successful outcome. Yet for others, marriage is often viewed as a
deal not worth making.
Marriage and the modern-day American family have changed dramatically
over the years. The age at which people marry is going up, the rate of marriage
is falling, almost half of all marriages fail, and the number of children born
outside of marriage is on the rise (1). The percentage of children growing up
in single-parent households is the highest in the developed world (1). Assistive
reproductive technologies have become more advanced and commonplace,
and at least 37 states and the District of Columbia have legally recognized
same-sex marriage.1
But these changes do not affect everyone the same way. Carbone and Cahn
specifically suggest that “economic inequality is remaking the American
family along class lines,” (1) with educated families better able to maintain the
traditional, stable family model than their less educated and less financially
secure counterparts. The vanishing “middle”—largely a result of the decline
in decent-paying blue-collar jobs and mid-level management positions—has
exacerbated already diverging marriage markets between the rich and the
poor. The authors explain that “marriage has disappeared from the poorest
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communities, . . . [and], in a reversal of historical trends, elite women have
become the most likely to marry” (2). In turn, divorce rates have dropped
dramatically for the most educated, while continuing to rise for everyone else.2
In their highly acclaimed previous joint effort, Red Families v. Blue Families:
Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture, Carbone and Cahn went beyond
purely political or value-based divides and examined emerging family models
through the lens of a rapidly changing post-industrial economy.3 Picking up
on this theme, Marriage Markets thoughtfully examines the links between
evolving families, developments in family law, and growing class divisions,
and highlights the role of class in “scripting our lives” (2). Of course culture
(including ethnicity, race, sexuality, religion, and citizenship) also plays a
distinct role in family formations, and can account for family wealth gaps among
various groups of Americans. For example, the authors reveal how AfricanAmerican families were the so-called “canaries in the mine,” early victims of
social and economic inequality that has only become more widespread (27). But
the authors’ primary focus is on class (either independently or in intersection
with culture) as the true catalyst for the growing class chasm among American
families. The authors illustrate how greater economic inequality together with
increased participation of women in the labor market remade the terms of
marriage, divorce, and child-rearing—“[p]ut the two strands together . . . and
you have the elements of a new family strategy increasingly beyond the reach
of the working class” (46).
The modern family model rests on a new “social script” that contemplates
“spousal independence” (93)—but this “elite model of family law” (105) is out
of reach for many families. Indeed, Carbone and Cahn depict two different
social scripts that are more or less predetermined based on class. In one script,
marriage and families thrive. For Tyler and Amy, a middle- to upper-class
Midwestern couple in their late twenties/early thirties, marriage and having
kids were in the cards. They met during their second year of law school, got
married shortly after graduating, and had the benefit of financial support from
their parents as they transitioned into their professional careers as attorneys.
Despite accruing debt from law school, the chances that Tyler or Amy would
ever need public assistance were slim to none.
In the other script, marriage is less accessible and often viewed as a deal that
is less than preferable. For Lily, unmarried and four months pregnant, and
her boyfriend Carl, jobless and living at home with his parents, marriage is
unlikely. Both struggled financially, and while Lily believed she could handle
the challenge of supporting herself and her child, the thought of marrying
2.
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Carl and the prospect of having to support him was too much. Although Tyler
and Lily grew up near each other, shared the same ethnic heritage, and perhaps
50 years ago would have led similar lives with similar outcomes, today, the
authors explain, their lives are dramatically different with respect to future job
prospects, relationships, and childbearing.
Throughout their narrative of diverging social scripts, Carbone and Cahn
portray the family in economic and market-based terms, treating the marriage
partnership much like any other contract that comes with rights and obligations
on both sides. Like other market exchanges, married partners trade economic
responsibility for some degree of financial security. The authors plainly note
that “relationships do occur as a result of an exchange, just like the purchase of
the latest iPhone. . . . These exchanges, like other kinds of human interactions,
also reflect supply and demand” (8). Using market rhetoric, the authors
explain the real transaction costs and demand curves that bear on our human
relationships. They put forward the unromantic but highly realistic notion that
our intimate relationships are deeply driven by economics—when the available
supply of economically suitable partners is insufficient or marriage imposes
obligations that they cannot meet, for example, people opt against marriage.
There is perhaps an inherent discomfort in using the language of exchange
for human commodities, as the authors do, turning “unique individuals
into fungible entities with monetary values.”4 But the authors’ nuanced
market-based arguments rightly take into account the distinct qualities of
intimate relationships, recognizing that they inherently “depend on trust,
. . . incorporate assumptions about gender, and . . . reflect community
reinforcement (or obstruction in the case of same-sex couples) of institutions
like marriage” (8). Those who might object to the commodification of families
and human relationships in this way should rest assured that the authors’
market observations are backed up by in-depth research and solid statistical
analyses. The authors deftly walk the line of analyzing couples as market
actors as well as human and emotional actors.
In the most developed and perhaps most novel second section of the book,
the authors examine the “gender bargain,” or the “terms on which men and
women find it worthwhile to forge lasting relationships” (2). Whereas in 1960
the average age of marriage was 20 for women and 22 for men (61-62), today, on
average, a first marriage occurs at ages 27 and 29, respectively.5 Individuals are
increasingly investing in career and education before opting for marriage. The
pill and abortion, the authors note, played a pivotal role in allowing women
more autonomy over both family and career choices. In the process, these
technologies have helped redefine marriage markets, expanding the timetable
4.
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for marriage and thus increasing the information available for prospective
couples thinking about forming families:
Women have achieved a measure of independence. With greater wariness of
interdependent relationships, both men and women can now go it alone. They
can live by themselves, choose an intimate partner with no strings attached,
live with roommates of their choice, or move back in with mom and dad.
Marriage is optional (124).

There is a lot riding on marriage today. In this “high stakes negotiation” to
find the best partner, couples consider not only their emotional connection,
but also the financial realities. For example,
A globe-trotting journalist, male or female, is not likely to marry a restaurant
owner rooted to one place. This search builds in more uncertainty—the college
student who plans to make a killing on Wall Street may enjoy better marital
prospects at thirty-two than at twenty-two but only if he succeeds. The most
ambitious of the women who may find him attractive will also wait to see how
both of their lives turn out. Mating and dating have become a higher stakes
game (43).

Key to understanding how and why modern-day couples enter into marital
bargains requires an understanding of the ratios of available men and women
in a given market. Changing gender ratios reinforce class divides by affecting
the marital bargains that underlie marriage markets. Just as the supply and
demand of commodities drive prices, gender ratios are the catalyst behind
both men’s and women’s choices about whom and whether to marry.
As the number of women increases beyond the number of desirable men
(i.e., those who have the educational background and employment status to
qualify as marriage material) in a particular area or market, the more desirable
men in the market are free to “play the field” and generally do not have to
commit in order to have a sexual relationship or to have children. In other
words, the most eligible bachelors in such markets are less inclined to commit
to marriage and can afford to wait longer to marry if they choose. Similarly,
where the number of eligible men is greater in a given market, the most eligible
women can be choosier before committing to a long-term mate.
Higher-income couples that have college degrees, have started their
respective careers, and have waited to have children have the benefit of
choosing among the best marital bargains. They also enjoy a greater likelihood
of family stability. Meanwhile, both men and women on the lower rungs of
the economic ladder have far fewer choices when it comes to marriage. For
women like Lily, with limited choices of marriageable men, the costs of the
marital bargain may exceed the benefits. The net result of these gender ratios
is a sharpening class divide. While higher-earning adults tend to marry other
educated high-income adults, low-income, less educated adults tend either
not to marry or to marry other similarly situated adults. Couples who pursue
education and career first and wait to get married reflect and reinforce existing
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class structures. The elite marry the elite, which in turn creates a “feedback
loop” of advantages for their children, and reinforces economic inequality
between families at the top and those at the bottom (87).
Another central component to Carbone and Cahn’s thesis is the role that
family law plays in reinforcing diverging marriage markets and affecting
other personal choices people make. Section III richly details how legal
developments have contributed to the class divide in family life (103-140).
Despite the existence of two distinct social scripts, the law mirrors only one
of them. The authors explain how new legal rulings “reflect the assumptions
of the upper third” while “reject[ing] the contingent arrangements of the
marginalized groups who have given up on marriage altogether” (110). Shifts
in family law, while responding to the changing needs of higher-income
families, simply reinforce for low-income couples the notion that marriage
offers more burden than benefit.
Historically, family law has reflected and reinforced patriarchal cultural
norms, perpetuating defined gender roles, with women being financially
dependent on their husbands as they raise families together. As women have
become more autonomous and greater financial contributors, family law
has slowly responded. The new legal model contemplates shared financial
and domestic contributions, without distinguishing between the two when
assessing and measuring relative contributions to the family. The model also
assumes joint responsibility for finances and child-rearing. Most notably, the
law has moved toward equal division of property, decreased support awards
that are limited generally to long-term homemaker, and shared parenting. The
authors expose how this new “egalitarian family law” works well for highearning couples, or couples who make relatively equal marital contributions,
but tends not to work for lower- and working-class couples, further contributing
to diverging marriage markets (111).
As the book’s fictional couples move further apart, the law has failed to
evolve in a way that responds to both couples’ developing needs. Formal
family law decisions now give voice to the new marital script followed by Tyler
and Amy, supporting, for example, their possible divorce:
. . . Tyler would automatically be treated as a father. The parties would be
expected to split their joint assets. Alimony would be rare, particularly after a
marriage of less than ten years. The judge would ask them to list any children
born during the marriage and before the court would approve a divorce, it
would make arrangements for both parents to continue to be involved in the
children’s lives. . . . If they were to part, the law would reflect the commitment
they made to each other as an on-going obligation (104).

On the other hand, the authors reasonably conclude that the “mandated
sharing of assets, children, and lives can be a threat to those whose lives
are unstable and unequal” (119). If Lily and Carl were to split, for example,
though the formal law that would apply to them would be the same, it would
not provide the same mutual benefit as provided to their married counterparts:
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[Formal family law] would apply only if Carl establishes paternity and gets
himself to court. Lily, proud of her independence, has no duty to identify Carl
as the biological father or to list him on the birth certificate. If after their child
is born Carl wants to see the baby, Lily would have no obligation to let him
do so in the absence of a court order. . . . In the meantime, Carl is most likely
to have any relationship with the child at all only if he keeps Lily happy—
contributing financially, offering to help with childcare, and staying out of the
rest of her life. Lily in turn already distrusts Carl and she will be even less likely
to welcome his involvement if she starts to see another man (105).
The “new elite model of family law” simply makes marriage even less
attractive for the lower third, who will often prefer to realize their relationships
on their own terms, limiting the role the law plays in their relationships.
As solutions, in Section IV, the authors’ proffer two strategies: (1) rebuilding
from the top down, which involves examining the family in the context of
inequality in employment; and (2) rebuilding from the bottom up, which
requires directly addressing the needs of children (141-201).
First, rebuilding from the top down requires rebuilding the foundation of
the middle class through employment and improved labor markets. According
to the authors, reforming corporate culture, creating stable jobs, reforming
the minimum wage, and subsidizing job creation, among other means of
rebuilding employment, will have the result of strengthening the American
family, so that couples like Lily and Carl can access the more preferable life
script.
Rebuilding from the bottom up necessitates “rebuilding the infrastructure
that supports investment in children from early childhood through early
adulthood” (143). The authors unveil the growing class gap in children’s
“cognitive achievements, civic engagement, and athletic participation” (158).
The solution, they say, is greater support for mothers during pregnancy, and
going forward through early childhood and beyond secondary education.
“Supporting the next generation means supporting parents” (164). With the
reintegration of women into the workforce, seventy percent of children now
live in houses in which all the adults work. To access the more preferable
life script, these dual-income families must earn enough “to pay others to
provide childcare and ‘enrichment’ activities” (159). For those who do not,
this paradigm requires family-friendly workplace reforms such as expanded
family leave, increased flexibility for parents to use sick leave benefits to care
for their children, and enhanced work-week flexibility. Additionally, Carbone
and Cahn advocate for a more flexible family law regime that recognizes and
adapts to changes in the American family—e.g., same-sex parents, multi-parent
and stepparent families, non-biological parents, and the like—and thus works
for all families regardless of social script.
The authors offer vitally important economic solutions to closing the
class gap in family formations. One thing they do not take on, however, is
a critique of the institution of marriage as a legitimate construct in the first
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place. The authors clearly recognize that the legal parameters of marriage may
exacerbate the existing class inequity in family structures. Their solutions,
however, involve reforms such as expanding the social safety net, creating
better-paying blue-collar jobs, and reforming traditional family law structures,
without tackling an underlying threshold problem of the state’s involvement
with intimate relationships and its role in promoting marriage. Although the
authors critique the existing marriage model, representing it as an exclusive
institution for higher earners that further entrenches the class divide, they
still idealize a more egalitarian marriage construct as the sought-after optimal
outcome. Of course, challenging the entire institution of marriage may be
beyond the scope of a book that deals thoroughly with the vast inequities in
the existing framework, and is perhaps better left for another discussion.
Timely, poignant, extremely readable, and highly recommended for any
Family Law or even Contracts class, Marriage Markets tells the story of what
has happened to the economics of the American family in a compelling,
concise narrative supported by rock-solid statistical evidence. Although the
book has an audience potentially much wider than law professors, the value
for law faculty cannot be overstated. Marriage Markets brings to light the
socio-economic factors that underlie many of the family law decisions found
in the traditional casebook offerings, even when not explicitly acknowledged
in the cases themselves. Bringing this factual context into the classroom would
facilitate discussions of class, race, and cross-cultural sensitivity, and allow for
a more enriching discussion of the cases overall. This book is necessary reading
for the next generation of law students, who will ultimately play an integral
part in assuring that family law keeps pace with evolving family norms.
More so than ever, class is the catalyst for diverging marriage markets. To
help close this chasm, the authors argue for a rethinking of legal and economic
structures that reflects changing family structures. As the authors plainly state,
“any analysis or proposed solution that does not take growing inequality into
account is based on a lie” (5). Indeed, recognizing and acknowledging the
effects of this inequality on family structures is a critical first step.

